Know thy enemy, why do start-ups fail

This article discusses why start-ups fail, I could add a few to the list, but to keep your read short I have just included what David Feinleib who is a partner at MDV – Mohr Davidow Ventures, talked about.

Why start-ups fail

An entrepreneur recently asked me why startups fail. Startups fail because they run out of money. You’re probably thinking, “Tell me something I don’t already know!” Read on and you’ll see that statement is deceptive in its simplicity
This post is based both on my experience as an investor and as entrepreneur (when I’ve boot-strapped and venture-funded).
They spend too much on sales and marketing before they’re ready. Many venture companies move to a high burn rate too quickly and it’s hard to go back. Sometimes even a frugal entrepreneur winds up spending too much either because he doesn’t manage the money or is tempted by having money in the bank. This often happens when a startup raises too much money too early.
Other times, this occurs with entrepreneurs who are accustomed to having lots of resources. They ramp up sales before the product is ready. Of course, there’s a lot of work required to get sales early on. But a product with a truly great value proposition that delivers in a measurable way will practically sell itself. Companies that ramp sales and marketing too soon waste a lot of money.
Sometimes even when the product is great, the sales process itself isn’t understood to a point where it can be scaled: who are you selling to, how much will they really spend, and what profile of sales person does the company need to hire who will succeed at selling that particular product. All of this has to be understood before sales can efficiently scale.
Spending on the sales and marketing operations means there is no return if customers don’t bite. When you spend money on the product that work can be leveraged in future versions. (In fact, the key to effective product delivery is to try a lot of things and see what sticks.) For every venture dollar invested, I estimate that more than two-thirds go into sales costs and only a third into product development. Once you up the burn rate, there’s no easy way back.
The market outpaces the startup’s ability to execute. When you’re in a race, the only thing that matters is winning. To win a race, you have to be the fastest.
In the case of the startup in a hot sector that means how fast do you make critical decisions, hire key personnel, and manage limited resources. If, on average, you’re slower or less efficient than your competitors, you’re very likely burning more cash than they are as well. The chief executive sets the pace. If the CEO dithers on important decisions – let’s say making key hires – it slows the whole operation.
Take Company X (a composite). Entrepreneur X caught a case of what I call “analysis paralysis.” He took 14 months to hire for a key position. At Stanford, my professors would ask: “Would you choose X or Y, or do you need more data?” Students often wanted more data. The professors would chuckle and call them on it: “There is no more data.” A simple, but valuable lesson: In the real world, you rarely have a complete picture. You have to work your hunches, draw on past experience and the available information. Unlike solving engineering problems, there is no perfect answer when it comes to hiring – you need to get all the data you can through references, interactions, and simulated projects, but ultimately it’s very subjective.
There is no Entrepreneur. I know what you’re thinking, “Every startup has an entrepreneur.” What I mean is an entrepreneur with a capital “E.” Let me explain: A lot people have good ideas and some are even able to execute on them. But rare is the man or woman who can take an idea and transform it into a sharply defined product and then sell it to top-level prospective hires, investors and customers. An Entrepreneur as opposed to his lower-case counterpart is a product picker and a market visionary.
Company Y (a composite) was a startup with near-flawless execution but no clear vision. CEO Y tried his last company’s strategy and when it failed found himself at a loss for what to do. The company ran out of money and was forced to sell out for a pittance. Meanwhile, CEO Y’s main competitor was more nimble. He reacted quickly to market changes with a viable contingency plan and as a result sold his startup for many times that sum.
Without strong product and market vision, a startup will burn through cash as its team collectively struggles to define its position.
The market takes too long to develop. Often, entrepreneurs are ahead of their time. Customers are not ready to spend money on or change habits for unproven benefits. The company runs out of money waiting for the market to develop or it tries to start over, but it’s too late.
Company Z (a composite) had a compelling concept, but customers weren’t ready to buy in. CEO Z proposed a restart: Rather than sell to the market segment he was in, he would target a different market segment. As a result, he would significantly reduce Company’s Z’s sales and marketing expenses. Company Z was mildly successful with its new plan, but burned through lots of cash before it re-configured. My guess is that it will be bought for little more than the amount that’s been invested.
Risky BusinessVC’s play a high-risk game. We have to identify opportunity and risk and then accept that a certain amount of that risk will result in failure. Venture capitalists lump failures into one of two categories.
A failure like Company Z’s: A startup that struggles for reasons beyond the entrepreneur’s control. Things look good, but ultimately mainstream customers or a large volume of users were unwilling to take a chance on a new concept. Skilled execution and a reasonable backup plan won’t compensate for a market that fails to develop as quickly as originally anticipated. Some entrepreneurs are able to switch markets completely early on – if they haven’t raised and spent too much cash. But in this scenario, all companies in the given market flounder or fail. It isn’t a desired outcome but it’s not for lack of trying.
The painful failures – those that keep me and other VCs I know up at night - are the investments that fail due to self-inflicted wounds. A competitor winds up owning what turns out to be a very large market. The other company simply moved faster and out-executed.
It’s not just how fast you run the race that matters. It’s how fast the race is run. When it comes to startups, speed wins. But if you’re still early, don’t increase your burn and overspend on sales and marketing before you’re ready. Sometimes you have to slow down to speed up.

By David Feinleib

Slainte

Gordon

Introduction to Angel Investors (Angel Investors 101)

An angel investor or angel is an affluent individual who provides capital for a business start-up, usually in exchange for convertible debt or ownership equity. A small but increasing number of angel investors organize themselves into angel groups or angel networks to share research and pool their investment capital.

Source and extent of funding
Angels typically invest their own funds, unlike venture capatalist, who manage the pooled money of others in a professionally-managed fund. Although typically reflecting the investment judgment of an individual, the actual entity that provides the funding may be a trust, business, limited liability company, investment fund, etc.
Angel capital fills the gap in start-up financing between "friends and family" (sometimes humorously called "friends, family, and fools") who provide seed funding, and venture capital. Although it is usually difficult to raise more than a few hundred thousand dollars from friends and family, most traditional venture capital funds are usually not able to consider investments under US$1–2 million. Thus, angel investment is a common second round of financing for high-growth start-ups, and accounts in total for almost as much money invested annually as all venture capital funds combined, but into more than ten times as many companies (US$25.6 billion vs. $26.1 billion in the US in 2006, into 51,000 companies vs. 3,522 companies)Of the 51,000 US companies that received angel funding in 2006, the average raise was about US$500,000. Healthcare services, and medical devices and equipment accounted for the largest share of angel investments, with 21 percent of total angel investments in 2006, followed by software (18 percent) and biotech (18 percent). The remaining investments were approximately equally weighted across high-tech sectors.

Investment profile
Angel investments bear extremely high risk, and thus require a very high return on investment. Because a large percentage of angel investments are lost completely when early stage companies fail, professional angel investors seek investments that have the potential to return at least 10 or more times their original investment within 5 years, through a defined exit strategy, such as plans for an IPO or a trade sale. Current 'best practices' suggest that angels might do better setting their sights even higher, looking for companies that will have at least the potential to provide a 20x-30x return over a five- to seven-year holding period. After taking into account the need to cover failed investments and the multi-year holding time for even the successful ones, however, the actual effective IRR for a typical successful portfolio of angel investments might, in reality, be as 'low' as 20-30%. While the investor's need for high rates of return on any given investment can thus make angel financing an expensive source of funds, cheaper sources of capital, such as bank financing, are usually not available for most early-stage ventures, which may be too small or young to qualify for traditional loans.

Profile of investor community
The term "angel" originally comes from England where it was used to describe wealthy individuals who provided money for theatrical productions. In 1978, William Wetzel completed a pioneering study on how entrepreneurs raised seed capital in the USA, and he began using the term "angel" to describe the investors that supported them.
Angel investors are often retired entrepreneurs or executives, who may be interested in angel investing for reasons that go beyond pure monetary return. These include wanting to keep abreast of current developments in a particular business arena, mentoring another generation of entrepreneurs, and making use of their experience and networks on a less-than-full-time basis. Thus, in addition to funds, angel investors can often provide valuable management advice and important contacts.

According to the Center for Venture Research, there were 234,000 active angel investors in the U.S. in 2006. Beginning in the late 1980s, angels started to coalesce into informal groups with the goal of sharing deal flow and due diligence work, and pooling their funds to make larger investments. Angel groups are generally local organizations made up of 10 to 150 accreditted investors interested in early-stage investing. In 1996 there were about 10 angel groups in the U.S.; as of 2008 there are over 300, with a roughly equal number in all other countries combined; these groups accounted for approximately 10,000 individual angel investors in 2008. The more advanced of these groups have full time, professional staffs; associated investment funds; sophisticated web-based platforms for processing funding applications; and annual operating budgets of well over US$250,000. A recent development, particularly in North America, has been the emergence of networks of angel groups, through which companies that apply for funding to one group are then brought before other groups to raise additional capital.

Have a look at these groups for further information:

Archangel Informal Investment Limited UK
Braveheart Investments UK
New Vantage Group US
LINC Scotland
Connectonthenet

Slainte

Gordon